In the summer of 2005, the RAND Corporation, the think tank to the military-industrial complex submitted a report entitled “Rebuilding Iraq” commissioned by the Army. It was critical of both civilian and military leadership and planning following the initial combat phase in Iraq. As was usual with such reports an unclassified version was prepared but, unlike other reports, was not released to the public. Apparently the Army brass did not want to piss off the redoubtable and vengeful then Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld whose nuanced views of post-war Iraq planning were encapsulated in the dictums “Stuff happens!” and “freedom’s untidy”. Or as a Pentagon spokesman responded to why the report still had not been released by early 2008, “analysts had in some cases taken a broader perspective on the early planning and operational phases of Operation Iraqi Freedom than desired or chartered by the Army.” Translation: the report’s authors had committed the twin sins of (1) anchoring their findings in the context of the other foul-ups happening at the time and thereby (2) telling the Army (and this Administration) what they didn’t want to hear. And if they didn’t want to hear it, you better believe they weren’t going to let us hear it either.